Early 20th Century Perceptions of Civil Law-Common Law Difference: F.L. Joannini’s Spanish-English Civil Code Translations in Context by Brostoff, Seth S.
Journal of Civil Law Studies 
Volume 11 Number 1 Article 4 
11-29-2018 
Early 20th Century Perceptions of Civil Law-Common Law 
Difference: F.L. Joannini’s Spanish-English Civil Code Translations 
in Context 
Seth S. Brostoff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Seth S. Brostoff, Early 20th Century Perceptions of Civil Law-Common Law Difference: F.L. Joannini’s 
Spanish-English Civil Code Translations in Context, 11 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2018) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol11/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
 
 
EARLY 20TH CENTURY PERCEPTIONS OF CIVIL LAW-
COMMON LAW DIFFERENCE: F.L. JOANNINI’S SPANISH-
ENGLISH CIVIL CODE TRANSLATIONS IN CONTEXT 
Seth S. Brostoff *  
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 106 
II. Background to Spanish-English Civil Code                           
Translations (1899-1917) ....................................................... 110 
A. Walton’s Spanish Civil Code Translation (1899):                           
A Common Lawyer’s Approach ........................................ 115 
B. Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code Translation (1905):                      
A Civil Law Alternative ..................................................... 120 
C. Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code Translation (1917):                 
More Civilian Yet?............................................................. 128 
D. Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code Translation (1920):                       
A Modified Civilian Approach .......................................... 131 
III. Critical Responses to Joannini and Wheless:                                     
Book Reviews from Legal Scholars ....................................... 133 
IV. Competing Comparatist Paradigms of                                               
Civil Law-Common Law Difference ..................................... 137 
V. Conclusions ............................................................................ 145 
 
                                                 ABSTRACT 
 
The proper method for translating Spanish and Portuguese civil 
law concepts into English was a topic of debate among civil law 
scholars and comparatists at the turn of the last century. This article 
examines the translation approaches of three Americans (Clifford 
Walton, F.L. Joannini, and Joseph Wheless) who independently 
translated the Spanish, Colombian, Argentine, and Brazilian Civil 
Codes during the period 1899-1920. Specifically, Walton’s (1899) 
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Spanish Civil Code translation’s use of common law English is con-
trasted with Joannini’s Colombian (1905) and Argentine (1917) 
Civil Codes translations’ preference for a “civilian” legal lexicon, 
including substantial borrowing from the special civil law English 
vocabulary of the Louisiana Civil Code. 
 Joannini’s as well as Wheless’s use of civilian terminology re-
ceived mixed reviews in law journals. Disagreement among com-
paratists about the translators’ methods is explored below and 
placed within the context of contemporary English-speaking schol-
arly paradigms of civil law-common law difference, including atti-
tudes to civilian terminology. The article concludes with observa-
tions about the role of intellectual history and political crosscur-
rents—especially the creation of new mixed legal systems during the 
19th and early 20th centuries—in shaping English and American 
attitudes to the civil law tradition in general and to legal translation 
in particular.  
 
Keywords: legal translation, civil code, Spanish civil law, Spanish 
craze 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The translation of civil law terms and concepts into English is 
an inherently comparatist activity with challenges that are well-rec-
ognized by civil law scholars and legal translators.1 These chal-
lenges were particularly apparent during the first quarter of the 20th 
                                                                                                             
 1. See H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY & RESEARCH 117-18 (2d ed., Cam-
bridge U. Press 1949) (“The greatest strain [in legal translation] is naturally expe-
rienced by a lawyer who passes from a legal language of the Continent of Europe, 
founded to a large extent on the phraseology of Roman law, to the curious and for 
the most part unscientific terminology of Anglo-American law.”); Edgardo Rot-
man, The Inherent Problems of Legal Translation: Theoretical Aspects, 6 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 189 (1995) (“To translate a text from the language 
of a civil law country to the language of another civil law country is generally less 
complicated than to translate the same text to the language of a common law coun-
try.”); see also Olivier Moréteau, Les frontières de la langue et du droit : vers une 
méthodologie de la traduction juridique, 61 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
COMPARÉ 695, 706-09 (2009) (describing various problems of translation in com-
parative law, particularly translations across the civil law-common law divide); 
Alain Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law 
2018] SPANISH-ENGLISH CIVIL CODE TRANSLATIONS 107 
 
 
 
century, as the U.S. War Department and the new Comparative Law 
Bureau sponsored the publication of multiple Spanish-English civil 
code translations for use in the country’s new mixed legal systems 
or for comparative study of South American law. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy Spanish-English civil code translation of the period was 
F.L. Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code, which he translated for the 
Panama Canal Zone’s de facto government, the Isthmian Canal 
Commission, in 1905.2 Tasked with translating Colombian civil law 
terms and concepts into English for the use of Zone officials and 
territorial judges, Joannini relied heavily on civilian vocabularies, 
including the special legal lexicon of the Louisiana Civil Code, ra-
ther than the legal English of the common law. As a result, Louisiana 
civil law terms such as acquets and gains, lesion beyond moiety, and 
benefit of discussion all made their unexpected lexical debut on the 
Isthmus of Panama.3 
Not every translator of the period was so sensitive to civilian 
terminology. When Clifford Walton translated the Spanish Civil 
Code for the War Department’s use in Cuba in 1899, the U.S. Army 
lawyer largely embraced common law terminology to render civil 
law concepts into English. Thus, in Walton’s translation, trespass, 
fee simple, and easement are used while civil law terms are uncom-
mon.4 Joannini’s special emphasis on civilian English was therefore 
far from being the universal practice at the turn of the last century. 
Joannini nevertheless favored civil law English vocabularies in a 
                                                                                                             
Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language; Comparatists Be-
ware!, 69 LA. L. REV. 715, 735 (2009) (stating that translation of French civil law 
terms into legal English inherently obscures “the original and only authentic un-
derstanding” of the civilian concept being translated). 
 2. See THE CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA AND AMENDATORY 
LAWS CONTINUED IN FORCE IN THE CANAL ZONE… (Frank L. Joannini trans., 
Isthmian Canal Commission 1905) [hereinafter, Col. Civ. C.]. As Joannini trans-
lated directly from the Colombian Civil Code of 1887, this article refers to his 
translation as the Colombian (rather than Panamanian) code. 
 3. See infra Part II.B. 
 4. See infra Part II.A. 
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subsequent translation of the Argentine Civil Code of 1871 (pub-
lished by the Bureau in 1917),5 as did another American, Joseph 
Wheless, in his translation of the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 (com-
pleted in 1920).6 Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code translation re-
mained a primary source of private law in the Canal Zone until its 
repeal in 1933, while both Joannini’s and Wheless’s translations of 
the Argentine and Brazilian Civil Codes remained the principal Eng-
lish translations well into the 20th century.7 
While Walton’s translation largely escaped criticism, Joannini’s 
and Wheless’s preference for civilian vocabularies received mixed 
reviews in law journals, with some legal scholars arguing that their 
method of translation preserved unnecessary distinctions of termi-
nology between legal systems.8 Such criticism likely reflected 
widely held beliefs among late 19th and early 20th centuries civil 
law scholars and comparatists, who tended to emphasize the simi-
larity of the world’s two great legal traditions, the civil law and the 
common law. Indeed, many contemporary scholars argued that the 
two traditions were growing increasingly alike and that remaining 
differences were primarily distinctions of procedure and terminol-
ogy, rather than substance. Moreover, the creation of new mixed le-
gal systems vindicated predictions of global convergence as Amer-
ican colonial judges in Puerto Rico and the Philippines boasted that 
the two traditions were blending in their courtrooms without inci-
dent, and Pan-Americanism’s emphasis on uniform legislation for 
                                                                                                             
 5. See infra Part II.C. 
 6. See infra Part II.D. 
 7. See John O. Collins, Canal Zone Changes to Common Law System, 20 
A.B.A. J. 233 (1934) (discussing repeal of Colombian Civil Code in Zone); 
Charles Szladits, Notes on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes, 
3 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 70 & nn.29-33 (1954) (listing Joannini & Wheless as pri-
mary English translations available); Ricardo J. Navarro, A Bibliography of Latin 
American Law: Primary and Secondary Sources in English, 19 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
133, 140-41 (1984) (same listing thirty years later). 
 8. Layton B. Register, The Argentine Civil Code Together with Constitution 
and Law of Civil Registry, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 180, 182 (1918) (book review); E.G. 
Lorenzen, The Civil Code of Brazil, 30 YALE L.J. 652, 652 (1921) (book review); 
Max Radin, The Civil Code of Brazil, 9 CAL. L. REV. 443, 444 (1921) (book re-
view). 
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the Americas likewise created ideological incentives for overcom-
ing civil law-common law difference with technical (i.e., compara-
tive) solutions.9 In this context, Joannini’s creative translation ap-
proach, sensitive as it was to civil law-common law difference, ap-
pears at odds with strong, identifiable trends in early 20th century 
American legal thought, and it is easy to understand why civil law 
scholars and comparatists esteemed translations that presented civil 
law concepts in legal English (such as Walton’s) and criticized those 
that preserved the subtle lexical nuances of the two traditions (such 
as Joannini’s). 
As several scholars have noted, comparative law’s assumptions 
and methods have often been influenced by contemporary cultural 
and political developments, and this article argues that early 20th 
century American legal comparison was no exception.10 Joannini’s 
Spanish-English civil code translations, and the debates which they 
generated among comparatists and civil law scholars, provide valu-
able insight into the role that intellectual history and global political 
developments played in shaping early 20th century English and 
American attitudes to the civil law tradition in general and to the art 
of legal translation in particular.  
Having reviewed the historical context of Spanish-English civil 
code translations in Part I, this article continues in Part II with de-
scriptions of four civil code translations from the period and the in-
dividual translators’ different approaches to civilian terminology. 
Part III examines contemporary scholars’ mixed reviews of two of 
the four translations, while Part IV places negative reviews of the 
                                                                                                             
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See, e.g., Esin Örücü, Something Old, Something New in Comparative 
Law, 2 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 324, 324-27 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he history of 
comparative law runs parallel with the history of ideas” and briefly tracing devel-
opment of discipline against trends in European thought); Jonathan Hill, Compar-
ative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXF. J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 109-10 
(1989) (stating that “[t]hroughout this century trends in comparative law have 
been effected by world political events” and arguing that surrounding “political 
climate has a pervasive influence” on comparatist assumptions). 
110 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES  [Vol. 11 
 
 
 
translators’ preference for civilian vocabularies into broader per-
spective by analyzing early 20th century expectations of legal con-
vergence and contemporary comparatist assumptions about the fu-
ture of civilian vocabularies. Part V concludes with a discussion of 
the influence of political ideology on common law attitudes to the 
civil law, with a special focus on the role of mixed systems, includ-
ing Louisiana, in the survival of “civilian English.” 
II. BACKGROUND TO SPANISH-ENGLISH CIVIL CODE TRANSLATIONS 
(1899-1917) 
Though mostly forgotten today, political developments at the 
turn of the last century brought the Hispanic world’s civil law sys-
tems to the attention of American comparative law scholars at a crit-
ical moment in the discipline’s development. Specifically, the crea-
tion of new mixed legal systems in Spain’s former colonies of 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines brought American colonial judges 
and civil law scholars into sustained contact with Spanish civil law. 
This process repeated itself on a smaller scale in the Canal Zone, 
which the United States had acquired in 1904 in order to complete 
construction of the transoceanic Panama Canal.11 At the same time, 
American business expansion in Latin America spurred widespread 
                                                                                                             
 11. See, e.g., JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, EL CHOQUE DE DOS CULTURAS JURÍDICAS 
EN PUERTO RICO (1991) (examining the gradual introduction of common law doc-
trines into private law jurisprudence of Puerto Rico by American colonial judges 
during early decades of island’s mixed legal system); Manuel Rodríguez Ramos, 
Interaction of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in the Legal Method of Puerto 
Rico, 23 TUL. L. REV. 1, 1-22 (1948) (discussing the creation of mixed system in 
Puerto Rico); WINFRED LEE THOMPSON, INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN LAW IN 
THE PHILIPPINES AND PUERTO RICO (U. of Arkansas Press 1989) (reviewing the 
creation of mixed legal system in American-controlled Philippines after Spanish-
American War); WAYNE D. BRAY, THE COMMON LAW ZONE IN PANAMA: A CASE 
STUDY IN RECEPTION 94-122 (Inter American U. Press 1977) (documenting the 
development of mixed system in Canal Zone as well as gradual replacement of 
Colombian private law in Zone between 1904-1933). For a brief overview of these 
mixed systems’ early development, see also Luis Muñiz-Argüelles, Puerto Rico, 
in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 381-93 (2d 
ed., Vernon Valentine Palmer ed. 2012) [hereinafter MIXED JURISDICTIONS 
WORLDWIDE]; Pacifico Agabin, The Philippines, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS 
WORLDWIDE at 452-80.  
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enthusiasm for the Pan-American movement’s promise of uniform 
commercial law.12 Over two decades, Pan-Americanism and legal 
mixing in the new insular possessions proved to be reliable catalysts 
for American comparison, as colonial judges applied both Spanish 
civil law and American public law in territorial courtrooms, influ-
ential law professors debated civil law-common law difference, and 
both groups speculated freely about the future relationship between 
the two legal traditions. As a result, American legal scholars pro-
duced a steady stream of literature concerning Spain and Latin 
America’s legal systems, introduced new courses on Spanish civil 
law at leading law schools, and widened opportunities for further 
comparison by translating multiple civil codes from Spanish into 
English.13  
                                                                                                             
 12. For the relationship of American business expansion in Latin America 
and Pan-American unification of law efforts, see Burton I. Kaufman, United 
States Trade and Latin America: The Wilson Years, 58 J. AM. HIST. 342, 343, 
358-61 (1971). For inter-American conferences discussing unification of U.S. and 
Latin American law during early years of the 20th century, see Curtis Wilgus, The 
Third International American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, 1906, 12 HISP. AM. 
HIST. REV. 420, 424, 444-48 (1932) (discussing the unification of hemispheric 
law efforts at 1906 conference) and John Bassett Moore, The Pan-American Fi-
nancial Conferences and the Inter-American High Commission, 14 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 343 (1920) (similar focus at Pan-American Financial Conference of 1915). 
 13. Early 20th century American legal scholars frequently commented about 
the stimulation of interest in civil law systems occasioned by American acquisi-
tion of civil law jurisdictions in the Spanish-speaking world. See, e.g., WILLIAM 
WIRT HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW 10 (2d rev. ed., Cambridge U. Press 
1905) (for Louisiana judge arguing: “We find ourselves confronted with new 
problems. Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines contain some twelve millions of 
people whom we control, more or less, and whose laws and jurisprudence we 
must, to some extent, at least, understand.”); 1 CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, 
ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD § 310 (Boston Book Co. 1917) (for Yale 
law professor stating: “For utilitarian reasons alone, ignoring all others, the Amer-
ican acquisition of Spain’s former colonies has given a tremendous impulse to the 
study of Roman and Spanish law in American law schools.”).  
 For early 20th century scholarship on Spanish civil law, see the numerous ar-
ticles in the new Comparative Law Bureau’s Annual Bulletin (1908-1914), includ-
ing: Samuel P. Scott, Spanish Jurisprudence Comparatively Considered, 2 ANN. 
BULL. 14 (1909); Samuel P. Scott, Spanish Criminal Law Compared with That 
Branch of Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence, 3 ANN. BULL. 62 (1910); Charles S. 
Lobingier, A Decade of Juridical Fusion in the Philippines, 3 ANN. BULL. 38 
(1911) [hereinafter, Lobingier, Juridical Fusion]; Charles S. Lobingier, The Span-
ish Law in the Philippines, 4 ANN. BULL. 32 (1911) [hereinafter, Lobingier, Span-
ish Law]. A “Spanish Craze” in comparative law spread also to the classroom, 
where Yale, Columbia, and Michigan offered courses on Spanish law by 1910. 
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Most of the Spanish-English civil code translations were a re-
sponse either to War Department administrative needs in new terri-
tories or were part of the Bureau’s Foreign Code Series. Shortly af-
ter the initial occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the 
United States promptly repealed Spanish-era penal codes and codes 
of civil and criminal procedure, though local private law codes were, 
to varying degrees, left intact. A similar process was followed in the 
Canal Zone a few years later, except that the department of Panama 
had not promulgated its own civil code during the brief interval be-
tween independence from Colombia in 1903 and American acquisi-
tion of the isthmus in 1904; thus, the United States adopted the Co-
lombian Civil Code of 1887 rather than local Panamanian legisla-
tion.14 In each possession, the official policy of retaining private law 
while replacing public law, adopted previously in Louisiana and in 
several British colonies, led to the creation of hybrid legal systems 
administered by American colonial judges working alongside local 
judges trained in Spanish civil law. During the period, the Spanish 
language was not widely taught or known in the United States, and 
competent translation of primary legal authority was therefore es-
sential.15 
After the mixed systems were established, the locus of transla-
tion activity shifted to the Comparative Law Bureau, whose mem-
bership overlapped with scholars of international law as well as the 
inter-American bar in New York. Economic expansion in South 
                                                                                                             
See COLUM. U., PRESIDENT’S ANN. REP. 115-16 (1902) (listing Spanish civil law 
courses); U. MICH. DEP’T OF L., ANN. ANNOUNCEMENT 1902-1903 27 (1902) 
(same); YALE U., CATALOGUE 375 (1908) (same). 
 14. See, e.g., Rodríguez Ramos, supra note 11, at 21 (describing the repeal 
of Puerto Rican penal code and codes of criminal and civil procedure, replacement 
with common law codes between 1902-1903); Lobingier, Spanish Law, supra 
note 13, at 39-40 (describing a similar process in Philippines between 1900-1902); 
BRAY, supra note 11, at 76, 96 & n.6 (describing a similar process in Canal Zone 
between 1905-1907).  
 15. See, e.g., J. Preston Hoskins, Statistical Survey of the Effect of the World 
War on Modern Language Enrollment in the Secondary Schools of the United 
States, 10 MOD. LANG. J. 87, 88 & tbl.1 (1925) (‘Comparative Table for the Whole 
United States’) (survey showing less than 1% of American high school students 
enrolled in Spanish language classes during pre-World War I period).  
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America, as well as Pan-Americanism’s emphasis on uniform legis-
lation, created heightened demand for American lawyers with spe-
cialized expertise in Latin American law, and the Bureau’s sponsor-
ship of Spanish-English code translations was meant to facilitate 
practical and scholarly access to the fundamental laws of the most 
important trading partners in the region.16  
The first Spanish-language civil code to be translated was the 
Spanish Civil Code of 1889. The Code had quickly been extended 
by Spain to her colonies and remained in force at the time Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines came under American control in 
1898. The following year, the military governor of Havana, Major-
General William Ludlow, ordered Walton, an American lawyer who 
had studied at the University of Havana and was now serving in the 
U.S. Volunteers, to translate the Code into English.17 Walton’s 
translation was completed in a matter of months, presumably in 
Cuba. He was assisted by a Cuban-born lawyer and political exile, 
Néstor Ponce de León, who had fled the Spanish colony for America 
in 1870; better remembered today as a correspondent of the revolu-
tionary José Martí, Ponce de León was also a literary figure and 
sometime lexicographer in New York.18  
                                                                                                             
 16. See, e.g., Andrew G. Peters, Importance of the Study of Latin-American 
Law, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 208, 210 (1916) (Treasury official’s address to ABA 
meeting advocating law school teaching of civil law systems as part of wider ef-
fort by legal profession to support American business expansion in Latin Amer-
ica); Phanor J. Eder, Pan-Americanism and the Bar, 43 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 340, 
341 (characterizing the knowledge of civil law systems as “the first essential” if 
American bar to play constructive role in Pan-American movement). 
 17. THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE IN FORCE IN SPAIN, CUBA, PUERTO RICO, AND 
THE PHILIPPINES (Clifford S. Walton ed., Clifford S. Walton and Néstor Ponce de 
León trans., La Propaganda literaria Printing House 1899) [hereinafter, Span. Civ. 
C.].  
 18. See RAIMUNDO CABRERA, CUBA Y SUS JUECES 297-98, 318 (Compañía 
Lévytype 1891). Ponce de León returned to Havana shortly after the Spanish-
American War and was appointed director and custodian of the Cuban National 
Archives. See [U.S. ARMY] HEADQUARTERS DIV. OF CUBA, CIVIL ORDERS AND 
CIRCULARS 167 (1899) (appointment order).  
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Over the next two years, the War Department translated dozens 
of Spanish-era laws for use in the new possessions.19 Among the 
department’s principal translators was Francis Leon Joannini, the 
son of an Italian minister to Mexico. Born in Italy, Joannini spent 
part of his youth in Mexico and was presumably fluent in Spanish.20 
As official translator for the Insular Affairs division, Joannini had 
already translated several Filipino legal codes by the time the Canal 
Zone approached him to translate the Colombian Civil Code. An 
Argentine code translation for the Bureau was completed in 1913 
(though not published for several years). At the time of his tragic 
death in an automobile accident in 1917, Joannini was at work trans-
lating the Peruvian Civil Code and drafting an English dictionary of 
Spanish legal terms.21  
Joannini’s last two civil code translations were part of the Bu-
reau’s aforementioned efforts to translate foreign law into English.22 
Although the Bureau commissioned or agreed to publish only six 
translations during its short existence, all but one (R.P. Shick’s 
translation of the Swiss Civil Code) were Spanish or Latin American 
codes. In the case of the Argentine and Peruvian Civil Codes, the 
translations were entrusted to a revision committee chaired by 
Phanor Eder, a Colombian-born lawyer based in New York. An en-
thusiastic proponent of Pan-Americanism, Eder was a major figure 
among New York’s inter-American bar up until his retirement in the 
1960s.23 The last translation approved by the Bureau was Wheless’s 
                                                                                                             
 19. E.g., DIV. OF CUSTOMS & INSULAR AFF. [DCIA], TRANSLATION OF THE 
NOTARIAL LAWS IN FORCE IN CUBA AND PUERTO RICO (1899); [DCIA], 
TRANSLATION OF LAW OF PORTS IN FORCE IN THE ISLAND OF CUBA (1900). 
 20. See “P.J.E.”, Necrology: Frank Joannini, 3 A.B.A. J. 104-05 (1917) (obi-
tuary with biographical details).  
 21. See A Deplorable Loss to Pan-Americanism, 6 SO. AMER. 33 (1917) (ad-
ditional biographical information). 
 22. See generally W.W. Smithers, Proceedings of the Comparative Law Bu-
reau, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1001, 1004 (1907) (listing the Bureau’s initial objec-
tives, including translation of foreign legislation into English).  
 23. See To Phanor James Eder, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 479 (1970) (issue dedi-
cation). As early as the 1920s, Eder and Wheless were among a small, recognized 
group of New York lawyers representing American interests in Latin America. 
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Brazilian Civil Code. Like Eder, Wheless was one of a handful of 
New York-based lawyers with experience representing clients in 
Latin America; prior to the Mexican Revolution, he had practiced 
law in that country and had written several articles on the subject of 
Mexican law.24 Indeed, there was a significant overlap between the 
Bureau’s translators, its Latin American editorial staff, and this 
small, cosmopolitan group of expatriate and émigré lawyers.25 
A. Walton’s Spanish Civil Code Translation (1899): A Com-
mon Lawyer’s Approach  
The military order instructing Walton to prepare a translation of 
the Spanish Civil Code was dated March 21, 1899; he was honorably 
discharged from the Army seven weeks later, on June 13.26 If Wal-
ton completed his translation before he left military service, he must 
have worked quickly. The assumption that the translation’s publica-
tion was expedited finds further support in the numerous typograph-
ical errors.27 A first edition nevertheless appeared that same year as 
The Spanish Civil Code, while a second edition, including a new 
historical introduction to Spanish law, was published in 1900 under 
the title The Civil Law in Spain and Spanish-America.28 By the time 
this second, expanded edition was published, Walton was pursuing 
                                                                                                             
See ENRIQUE GIL, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF ARGENTINE AND 
BRAZILIAN CIVIL LAW 3 (1921). 
 24. E.g., Joseph Wheless, A Lawsuit in Mexico, 22 GREEN BAG 612 (1910); 
Joseph Wheless, The Mexican Notarial System, 5 ANN. BULL. 42 (1912).  
 25. See Organization and Work of the Bureau of Comparative Law, 1 A.B.A. 
J. 591, 592 (1915) (listing  the Bureau’s editorial staff members for 1915). Shick 
was chairman, while Eder, Wheless, and Robert Kerr were editors for Latin Amer-
ica, Charles Lobingier for the Philippines, and Scott and Wheless for Spain. 
Wheless and Scott both translated codes for the Bureau, while Eder, Wheless, and 
Kerr served on multiple revision committees. 
 26. See Special Order No. 68 in Span. Civ. C. (preface) (March 21, 1899); 
[U.S. ARMY] ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFF., OFFICIAL REGISTER OF OFFICERS OF 
VOLUNTEERS 141 (1900) (listing discharge dated June 13, 1899). 
 27. See, for example, Span. Civ. C. 39-48, which alone contain seven mis-
spellings.  
 28. CLIFFORD STEVENS WALTON, THE CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH-
AMERICA (1900). 
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further studies (‘doctorando’) at the University of Madrid.29 Unfor-
tunately, while Walton supplemented this second edition with vari-
ous citations to several other Latin American civil codes, there is no 
evidence from the first edition suggesting which sources, if any, he 
may have used in preparing the original translation. 
Regardless of sources or legal training, Walton’s translation of 
the Spanish Civil Code has a decidedly “common law” feel to it. 
Throughout the translation, Walton rendered basic civil law con-
cepts into legal English rather than transliterate Spanish civil law 
concepts or use English civilian terminology. Thus, servidumbres, 
mandato, and tutela are translated as ‘easements’, ‘agency’, and 
‘guardianship’ rather than less-familiar civil law English terms such 
as servitudes, mandate, and tutorship.30 Likewise, tutela dativa is 
rendered ‘guardianship by appointment’ rather than the more-civil-
ian dative tutorship.31  
Nowhere is Walton’s method more apparent than in Book II 
(property), where bienes muebles and bienes inmuebles have been 
translated as ‘personal property’ and ‘real property’, respectively, 
rather than movables and immovables.32 Moreover, Walton intro-
duced legal English’s many distinctions between realty and person-
alty into his translation, even though Spanish civil law’s lexicon 
does not usually make such distinctions. Thus, civil law enajenación 
is often rendered ‘conveyance’ in the context of immovables, yet 
‘alienation’ or ‘sale’ when referring to movables.33 Throughout his 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. at tit.p. 
 30. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII (servidumbres = easements); Bk. IV, tit. 
IX (mandato = agency); Bk. I, tit. IX (tutela = guardianship).  
 31. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, ch. 4 (tutela dativa = guardianship 
by appointment).  
 32. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I (bienes muebles, bienes inmuebles = 
personal property, real property).  
 33. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 974-976 (enajenación = ‘con-
veyance’ in context of immovables); Bk. III, tit. III, art. 978; Bk. II, tit. VI, art. 
494 (enajenación = ‘alienation’, ‘sale’ in context of movables). Compare Louisi-
ana law: “In Louisiana, ‘Land is not ‘conveyed’ by deed but is sold…One sells 
land by the same contract and in the same way – in terms of theory – as one sells 
an automobile.” N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 
54 LA. L. REV. 1265, 1289 (1993) (emphasis in original) (citing Patrick H. Martin 
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translation, the long shadow of English property law (and its effect 
on legal English) is apparent: plena propiedad is ‘fee simple’,34 de-
sahucio is ‘ejectment’,35 and perturbación is ‘trespass’.36 
The Army lawyer was equally proactive in converting posses-
sory actions and obligations into common law English. In Book II 
(property), the Spanish action reivindicar is translated ‘recover’, 
while in Book IV (obligations), causa is ‘consideration’ (not 
cause),37 obligaciones solidarias are ‘joint obligations’,38 transac-
ción is ‘compromise’,39 and confusión is (usually) ‘merger’.40 At 
times, Walton’s gratuitous use of legal English serves little purpose 
other than to clothe his translation in the familiar legal English of 
Anglo-American law. Thus: ‘banns’ for proclamas,41 ‘Act of God’ 
for siniestro,42 ‘wear and tear’ for deterioros,43 and ‘writ of seizure’ 
for mandamiento de embargo de bienes.44 Throughout the transla-
tion, the common lawyer feels very much at home, though possibly 
misled about the subtle differences in terminology. 
The purpose in elaborating Walton’s translation preferences is 
not to suggest that Walton was ignorant of the distinctions between 
                                                                                                             
& J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas Law: An Overview of the 
Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 787-88 (1992)). 
 34. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. II, art. 634 (plena propiedad = fee simple).  
 35. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VII, art. 1656 (acción de desahucio = ejec-
tion).  
 36. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VI, art. 1560 (perturbación = trespass). 
 37. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. II, art. 348 (reivindicar = recover); Bk. IV, 
tit. II, arts. 1274-1277 (causa = consideration).  
 38. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, arts. 1136-1137 (obligaciones solidarias 
= joint obligations).  
 39. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIII, ch. 1 (transacción = compro-
mise). 
 40. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1156 (confusión = ‘merger’ in 
context of extinction of obligations); Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 546 (confusión = ‘merger’ 
in context of extinction of servitudes); but see Bk. IV, tit. I, arts. 1192-1194 (con-
fusión = ‘confusion’ in context of extinction of obligations). 
 41. See, e.g., Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 44 (proclamas = (marriage) 
banns). 
 42. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VI, art. 484 (siniestro = Act of God). 
 43. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. X, art. 1746 (deterioros = wear and tear). 
 44. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II, art. 1297 (mandamiento de embargo de 
bienes = writ of seizure). 
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the two legal traditions or of alternative civilian English vocabular-
ies. Indeed, some of the civil law concepts in the Spanish Civil Code 
were substantially equivalent to their common law counterparts, and 
the use of legal English was not likely to lead to confusion of inter-
pretation, although there was certainly this risk in several instances. 
Moreover, Walton was perfectly capable of rendering Spanish civil 
law concepts into English by transliteration or by using jurisdiction-
neutral English civil law terms. For example, donación is ‘donation’ 
(not, say, inter vivos gift), and vicios redhibitorios are ‘redhibitory 
vices’,45 while Walton hints at the important distinction between 
cause and consideration when he places the Spanish concept in pa-
rentheses on the initial use of the word (i.e., ‘consideration 
(causa)’), although admittedly without further elucidation.46 In a 
subsequent article for the Annual Bulletin, Walton even criticized 
War Department translators of the Filipino mortgage law, alleging 
confusion in their use of ‘property rights’ for derechos reales.47  
Nevertheless, Walton clearly preferred to use common law Eng-
lish terms for civil law concepts wherever possible. The risk of mis-
leading American lawyers into assuming that the two systems were 
broadly interchangeable was a risk Walton was willing to take, if he 
considered it a risk at all. Why the translator believed that a legal 
translation that de-emphasized legal difference was desirable is not 
certain. That the original translation’s target audience was military 
and civilian administrators is no doubt an important part of the ex-
planation, for such men were usually trained in the common law, if 
                                                                                                             
 45. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. II (donación = donation); Bk. IV, tit. IV, 
arts. 1491, 1499 (redhibición, vicios redhibitorios = redhibition, redhibitory 
vices).  
 46. See Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II, art. 1274 (causa). The important distinc-
tion between cause and consideration has long been recognized. See, e.g., 
GUTTERIDGE, supra note 1, at 117 (“Comparative lawyers are only too familiar 
with the kind of problem which lies concealed behind such words as causa and 
consideration.”); see also GREGORY W. ROME & STEPHAN KINSELLA, LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW DICTIONARY 7 (Quid Pro Books 2011) (“Cause is not the same thing 
as consideration.”). 
 47. See Clifford S. Walton, Interests of a Mortgagee in Real Property under 
the Common and Civil Law, 5 ANN. BULL. 63, 66 (1912). 
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they had any legal training at all. It is also probable that Walton 
lacked access in Havana to English translations of civil law materi-
als using civilian vocabularies, although these were certainly avail-
able in the United States.48 Yet even in the second edition (intended 
for a more academic readership), Walton made few changes, and he 
continued to use common law English terms to describe subtly-dif-
ferent Spanish civil law concepts in a subsequent article for the 
Comparative Law Bureau.49 
An equally likely explanation for Walton’s translation method 
was common practice of the time, which was relatively tolerant of 
translations of civil law materials into the legal English of the com-
mon law.50 It is important to note that this practice was conventional 
even among English and American civil law scholars and judges 
who otherwise exhibited a serious interest in comprehending the nu-
ances of civil law-common law difference.51  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 48. See, for example, the popular American edition of Harris’s translation of 
the Institutes using mandatary, dative tutor, compensation, and revendication: 
THOMAS COOPER, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 61, 284, 347, 445 (2d ed. 1841). 
 49. Clifford S. Walton, The Spanish Law of Prescription, 2 ANN. BULL. 25, 
26-28 (1909) (using the terms ‘adverse possession’, ‘tort’, and ‘real property’ for 
various Spanish civil law concepts).  
 50. This observation was previously made by Joseph Dainow in his explana-
tory note to the 1940 compilation of the Louisiana civil codes (with cross-refer-
ences to the Code Napoléon), in which he criticized both Wright’s (1908) and 
Cachard’s (1895) English translations of the French civil code. See Explanatory 
Notes, in COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA, LOUISIANA 
LEGAL ARCHIVES vol. 3, at xiii, xviii (State of Louisiana 1940) (regretting that 
French-English translations did not always use “the language of the civilian”) 
(cited in Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code in French: Translation and 
Retranslation, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223, 245 & nn.42-43 (2016) (briefly discussing 
problems of French civil law translations using legal English)). These problems 
are similarly present in other contemporary civil code translations. See, e.g., THE 
CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN (John Harington Gubbins trans., Maruya 1897) (translation 
of Japanese Civil Code using predominantly common law vocabulary).  
 51. See, e.g., E. BLACKWOOD WRIGHT, THE CODE NAPOLEON; BEING THE 
FRENCH CIVIL CODE passim (1908) (for British colonial judge comparing civil 
law and common law doctrines throughout translation but nevertheless rendering 
many French civil law terms into legal English). Wright was chief justice of the 
Seychelles.  
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B. Joannini’s Colombian Civil Code Translation (1905): A Civil 
Law Alternative 
By contrast, Joannini’s approach to his Colombian Civil Code 
translation was radically different to Walton’s, and we know much 
more about it. First, Joannini strove as much as possible to render 
Colombian private law concepts into “civil law English” rather than 
legal English. The desire to present civil law concepts in English 
without losing the tradition’s distinctive categories and terminology 
frequently meant turning to the civil law entries in Black’s Law Dic-
tionary, or in Books II-IV, adopting the civilian vocabulary of Lou-
isiana’s Civil Code. In an “Explanatory Note,” Joannini stated his 
reasons for avoiding use of legal English for civil law concepts: 
An effort has been made to secure as correct a translation as 
possible, and in some cases the translator may be accused of 
sacrificing what may be called good English for fidelity to 
the original text. He has been constantly on guard against 
making an interpretation of law instead of a translation.52 
Joannini’s policy of avoiding “making an interpretation of law” 
included more than merely “sacrificing what may be called good 
English.” It meant consistently reducing the use of technical legal 
English in order to limit opportunities for confusion by Americans 
trained exclusively in the common law tradition, as will be demon-
strated in greater detail below.  
Second, Joannini, unlike Walton, was more forthcoming about 
the materials he used for his translation: in a “List of Works Con-
sulted in Translating the Civil Code,” Joannini conveniently listed 
his principal sources.53 Among those which the translator consulted 
were Angarita’s Código Civil Nacional (de Colombia) Concordado 
(1888), two Spanish legal dictionaries (those of Alcubilla and 
Escriche), and, most importantly, Black’s Law Dictionary and Mer-
rick’s 1900 edition of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (which itself 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Explanatory Note in Col. Civ. C. at 10. 
 53. See id. at 9 for List of Works Consulted. 
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includes cross-references to corresponding articles in the Code Na-
poléon).54 The “List of Works Consulted” was not exhaustive, how-
ever. Elsewhere in the translation, Joannini cited articles in the Chil-
ean Civil Code,55 Howe’s first edition of Studies in the Civil Law,56 
and Mackeldy’s Handbook of Roman Law.57 Moreover, he referred 
on at least one occasion to various unnamed Spanish and French 
laws “to which the translator has had access,” while in a discussion 
of Book IV, title VII, Joannini indicated that he had consulted the 
Spanish, French, Italian, Mexican, and Dutch Civil Codes in an ef-
fort to better understand the title’s subject matter.58 In retrospect, his 
translation was a serious effort at legal comparison. 
The result of Joannini’s different approach, including his reli-
ance on Black’s and the Louisiana Civil Code, was a thoroughly ci-
vilian-feeling translation of Colombian private law. Where Walton 
had used ‘guardianship’ for civil law tutela, Joannini instead used 
tutorship (as well as related terms such as dative tutor, curator, 
etc.).59 Where Walton chose ‘easements’, Joannini chose servi-
tudes.60 Where Walton preferred ‘agent’, Joannini preferred manda-
tary.61 Cargas are never ‘liens’. ‘Writs’, ‘trespass’, and ‘ejectment’ 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. (citing various sources, including MARCELO MARTÍNEZ ALCUBILLA, 
DICCIONARIO DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN ESPAÑOLA (1892-1902), JOAQUÍN 
ESCRICHE, DICCIONARIO RAZONADO DE LEGISLACIÓN Y JURISPRUDENCIA (1888), 
REVISED CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA (Edwin T. Merrick ed., F. F. Hansell & Bro., 
Limited 1900) [hereinafter, La. Civ. C. (1870)], and HENRY C. BLACK, A 
DICTIONARY OF LAW (1891) [hereinafter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY]); see also 
John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280, 296 (1931) 
(discussing Merrick’s 1900 edition).  
 55. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. at 71 & n.†, 86 & n.* (citing to Chilean Civil Code 
arts. 208 & 266).  
 56. Id. at 153 & n.* (citing WILLIAM WIRT HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW 
79-80 (1896), for a discussion of civil law concept of real rights). 
 57. Id. at 164 & n.* (citing F. MACKELDY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW 
§ 271 (T. & J. W. Johnson 1883), defining “specification”).  
 58. See id. at 219 & fn.† (regarding assignments); id. at 326 & n.* (regarding 
facultative obligations).  
 59. Compare Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 50 (tutor = guardian), with Col. 
Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXII (tutor, tutela = tutor, tutorship) and Bk. I, tit. XXII, ch. 4 
(tutor dativa = dative tutor); see also Kinsella, supra note 33, at 1293. 
 60. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI (servidumbres = servitudes). 
 61. Compare Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX (mandato = agency), with Col. Civ. 
C. Bk. IV, tit. XXVIII (mandato, mandatario = mandate, mandatary). 
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are entirely lacking. Reivindicación is revendication (not mere ‘re-
covery’).62  
Based on even a cursory review, several important conclusions 
can be drawn from Joannini’s translation choices. First, Joannini 
preferred transliteration of Spanish-language civil law terms, in 
some circumstances even where the potential for confusion with le-
gal or colloquial English was significant: thus, compensación is usu-
ally rendered compensation, not ‘set-off’; transacción is transac-
tion, not ‘compromise’; and confusión is confusion, not ‘merger’.63  
Second, Joannini avoided legal English property terminology 
with its different distinctions between real estate and chattels, as this 
might have implied an exaggerated equivalence with distinctive ci-
vilian property law categories. Thus, in Joannini’s translation, 
bienes muebles are, correctly, movables and bienes inmuebles, im-
movables; only bienes raíces are real property.64 Absent is Walton’s 
invented distinction between sale of movables and conveyance of 
immovables: enajenación is usually translated alienation or sale, re-
gardless of context.65  
Third, in Joannini’s search for an English articulation of civil 
law concepts, he frequently relied on the distinctive legal English of 
Louisiana’s civil law tradition, in particular the special civil law 
English terminology of the Louisiana Civil Code. Thus, gananciales 
                                                                                                             
 62. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII (reivindicación = revendication).  
 63. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIV, art. 1625 (compensación, transac-
ción, confusión = compensation, transaction, confusion). Cf. Levasseur & Trahan, 
infra note 178, at 118, 127 (for English translators of Cornu’s Vocabulaire Jurid-
ique warning against translating compensation and confusion as common law set-
off and merger). 
 64. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I, ch. 1, 2 (bienes muebles, bienes inmuebles, 
bienes raíces = movables, immovables, real property); see also Bk. III, tit. XIII, 
art. 1457 (for rare use of ‘realty’). 
 65. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX, art. 576 (for alienation of mova-
bles); Bk. I, tit. XIX, art. 345 (for alienation of immovables); but see Col. Civ. C. 
Bk. I, tit. IX, art. 182 (for rare use of ‘convey’ for Spanish verb enajenar).  
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are acquets and gains,66 desheredación is disinherison,67 ob-
ligaciones solidarias are solidary obligations,68 and prestaciones 
mutuas are mutual prestations.69 Both lesión grave and lesión 
enorme are translated lesion beyond moiety,70 and beneficio de es-
cusión appears as benefit of discussion.71 The first and last examples 
are both instances where Joannini departed from his usual prefer-
ence for transliteration in order to follow the Louisiana Code’s 
unique vocabulary.  
Indeed, even in cases where Joannini had a choice between using 
a particular English civil law or Scots law term (which are plentiful 
in the first edition of Black’s), the translator frequently preferred the 
Louisiana term instead. Thus, curador de bienes is translated as cu-
rator ad bona rather than curator bonis.72 Elsewhere, título vicioso 
is vicious title (as opposed to Walton’s more common law-sounding 
                                                                                                             
 66. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, ch. 5 (gananciales = acquets and 
gains). “Community of acquets and gains. The community property matrimonial 
regime of Louisiana under which spouses are co-owners of certain property that 
either spouse acquires during the marriage.” ROME & KINSELLA, supra note 46, 
at 9 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2327, 2338-2340 (2011)); see also BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 28 (10th ed., Bryan A. Garner ed. 2014) (identifying acquets 
and gains as a Louisiana law term); cf. JOAQUÍN ESCRICHE, ELEMENTS OF THE 
SPANISH LAW 37-38 (Bethel Coopwood trans. 1886) (Texas lawyer using the term 
ganancial property instead). 
 67. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V, ch. 4 (desheredación = disinherison).  
 68. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX (obligaciones solidarias = solidary obli-
gations). For a recent discussion of the problem of translating solidary obligations 
as joint and several, see Moréteau, supra note 1, at 706, 709. 
 69. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII, ch. 4 (prestaciones mutuas = mutual 
prestations). The English ‘prestation’ survives also in Puerto Rican legal English. 
See, e.g., 31 LPRA § 3048 (‘mutual prestations’). 
 70. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXIII, ch. 13 (lesión enorme = lesion beyond 
moiety); Bk. III, tit. VII, art. 1291 (lesión grave = same). 
 71. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXXV, arts. 2383-84 (beneficio de excusión 
= benefit of discussion). Plea of discussion has since been abolished in Louisiana, 
but Joannini’s translation cites the earlier code articles that were then in effect. 
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3045 cmt. (a) (2017) (“This Article … abolishes the 
pleas of division and discussion formerly recognized in C.C. Arts. 3045-3051 
(1870).”). 
 72. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX (curador de bienes = curator ad 
bona), with LA. CODE PRACTICE art. 958 (curator ad bona); see also Welsh v. 
Baxter, 45 La. Ann. 1062, 1064 (1893) (discussing 1830 abolition of curators ad 
bona in Louisiana). See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 309; 
Black’s lists only the Scots law ‘curator bonis’. 
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‘flawed title’),73 and discernimiento (for appointment of dative tu-
tors) is confirmation.74 Similarly, Joannini’s preference for translat-
ing tenencia as seizin rather than tenancy (particularly in Book III 
(successions)) appears to imitate Louisiana legal English’s use of 
the former term in its own law of successions.75 
Despite an obvious preference for civil law terminology, Joan-
nini did not entirely avoid technical legal English. There are occa-
sional references in his Colombian Civil Code translation to cestui 
que trustent,76 flotsam and jetsam,77 and other common law terms. 
Both dolo and fraude have been (perhaps confusingly) rendered 
fraud, and Joannini occasionally used common law terms for unre-
lated Colombian civil law concepts.78 For the most part, however, 
Joannini confined legal English terms such as ‘agency’, ‘bailments’, 
and ‘easements’ to the translation’s index, where readers are di-
rected to search instead for mandate, loans for use and consumption, 
and servitudes.79 The result is a civil code translation well on its way 
to being purged of English property and contract law terminology.  
Joannini’s translation raises the interesting question: Why did he 
rely so heavily on the Louisiana Civil Code for articulating the civil 
law in English? There are at least two plausible explanations. First, 
Joannini may have been told to do so by the Isthmian Canal Com-
mission. Such a possibility is raised by parallel developments in 
Puerto Rico, where the local revision commission of two Americans 
and one Puerto Rican had recently incorporated language from the 
                                                                                                             
 73. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, art. 1792 (título vicioso), with 
La. Civ. C. art. 3452 (1870) (“vicious and defective title”). 
 74. Compare Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXIII, art. 463 (discernimiento = confir-
mation), with La. Civ. C. art. 260 (1870) (judicial “confirmation” of tutors). 
 75. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. VII, art. 1297 (tenencia = seizin); cf. La. 
Civ. C. arts. 940-949 (1870) (for seizin of heirs in Louisiana law of successions). 
 76. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VIII, art. 807 (fideicomisario = cestui 
que trustent).  
 77. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. IV, art. 710 (especies náufragas = flotsam and 
jetsam).  
 78. See Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. IX, art. 846; Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 768 (dolo, 
fraude); Bk. III, tit. V, art. 1245 (cuarta de mejoras = quarter betterments); cf. LA. 
C.C. ANN. art. 1231 (2017) (discussing “advantages” and “extra portions”). 
 79. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. at 599, 602, 622 (index terms).  
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Louisiana Code into Book I of the island’s Spanish-era Civil Code.80 
By making Canal Zone law look and sound more like Louisiana law, 
the Canal Zone government may have hoped that American colonial 
judges on the Isthmus, though unfamiliar with the civil law tradition 
generally, might nevertheless be able to interpret the local civil code 
using Louisiana jurisprudence. There is only scattered evidence 
from the Canal Zone’s law reports (1905-1926) of local judges ac-
tually applying Louisiana law in this way (assuming they even had 
access to Louisiana decisions), and, in any event, the Canal Zone’s 
mixed legal system did not survive the 1930s.81 Nonetheless, it is 
possible that Joannini’s many cross-references to Louisiana Code 
articles and use of the state’s legal English were meant to facilitate 
comparative use of Louisiana jurisprudence by American judges in 
Panama. 
A chief problem with this explanation, however, is scattered ev-
idence that Joannini began his translation work without the Louisi-
ana Civil Code. First, there are no cross-references to Louisiana 
Code articles in Book I (persons), although these are frequent else-
where in the translation.82 Second, the use of distinctive Louisiana 
civil law terms such as disinherison, lesion beyond moiety, and ben-
efit of discussion, is irregular and relatively infrequent until Book II 
(property), and is most pronounced in Books III and IV (succes-
sions, obligations). Third, although, as a rule, Joannini preferred ci-
vilian terminology to legal English, there are several instances in 
                                                                                                             
 80. 1 LUIS MUÑOZ MORALES, RESEÑA HISTÓRICA Y ANOTACIONES AL 
CÓDIGO CIVIL DE PUERTO RICO 22-44 (Junta Editora de la Universidad de Puerto 
Rico 1947) (discussing the work of the 1901-1902 revision commission including 
adoption of articles from Louisiana code). 
 81. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Panama R.R. Co., 2 C.Z. Rep. 111 (C.Z. 1913) 
(for a rare example of Canal Zone court applying Louisiana jurisprudence to ques-
tion of Colombian private law); see also Collins, supra note 7, at 233 (describing 
the Colombian Code’s repeal in 1933 and replacement by a new code based on 
California law). The adoption of a common-law code greatly reduced the potential 
influence of Louisiana jurisprudence in the Zone’s future legal development. 
 82. See, for example, Joannini’s citations to La. Civ. C. arts. 533 et seq. 
(1870) for parallel references to Louisiana law of usufruct, Col. Civ. C. at 182; 
La. Civ. C. arts. 2520 et seq. (1870) for revendication, Col. Civ. C. at 397; La. 
Civ. C. arts. 3176 et seq. (1870) for antichresis, Col. Civ. C. at 495; etc.  
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Book I where the translator initially used a common law term, such 
as ‘convey’ or ‘set-off’, only to abandon it by the middle of Book II, 
possibly suggesting a change of approach early on in the translation 
process.83 In further support of this conclusion, Joannini’s incon-
sistent alternation between translating fianza and caución as bond, 
surety, and suretyship appears to stabilize only in Book IV, or 
around the time that the translator would have compared the Colom-
bian articles to the Louisiana Civil Code’s articles 3035 et seq. on 
suretyship.  
A second explanation, therefore, seems more likely: Joannini de-
cided to consult the Louisiana Civil Code only after encountering 
numerous citations to its articles in the civil law entries in Black’s 
Law Dictionary.84 The fact that Alcubilla’s 1892 Diccionario (like 
many legal encyclopedias and dictionaries in the civil law tradition) 
cites to code articles for definitions of Spanish civil law terms may 
have reinforced in Joannini’s mind the utility of consulting an Eng-
lish-language civil code for his own translation work. By doing so, 
Joannini’s translation became truly comparative, as he checked his 
own definitions and civil law English vocabulary against that of the 
Louisiana Civil Code.  
That Joannini was satisfied with the approach is evident from 
the fact that he continued to employ Louisiana’s civilian terminol-
ogy in his subsequent translation of the Argentine Civil Code. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 83. See, e.g., Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, art. 182 (enajenar = convey); Bk. I, 
art. 207 (simple mandatario = simple agent); Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 818 (compensar 
= set off [n.]). By Bk. III, Joannini has abandoned convey, while in Bk. III, tit. 
XXVIII, he uses mandatary, and in Bk. IV, tit. XVII, he uses compensation.  
 84. See, e.g., entries for ‘curator’, ‘immovable’, ‘servitudes’ in BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 309, 593, 1085 (citing Louisiana Civil Code arti-
cles for civil law terms appearing in Books I and II).  
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Table 1. Spanish Civil Law Terms: Translation Choices in Walton 
and Joannini 
 
 
Spanish Civil  
Law Term 
 
Walton’s  
Translations 
Joannini’s  
Translations 
gananciales85 profits of the conjugal 
society (gananciales) 
acquets and gains* 
enajenación  
(of immovables)86 
conveyance alienation or sale [n.] 
enajenación  
(of movables)87 
alienation alienation 
desheredación88 disinheritance disinherison* 
tutela dativa89 guardianship by                    
appointment 
dative tutorship* 
bienes muebles, 
bienes inmuebles90 
personal property, real 
property 
movables, immovables 
reivindicar [v.]91 recover [v.] revendicate [v.] 
plena propiedad92 fee simple full ownership 
dolo [n.]93 deceit (dolo) or fraud dolus 
servidumbres94 easements servitudes 
obligaciones            
solidarias95 
joint obligations solidary obligations* 
confusión96 merger confusion 
                                                                                                             
 85. Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IV, art. 72; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXII, ch. 5. 
 86. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 974-976; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXIII, 
art. 1887 (alienation of immovables). 
 87. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, art. 978; Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXX, art. 
576 (alienation of movables). 
 88. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, arts. 848-857; Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V, 
arts. 1258-1259. 
 89. Span. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. IX, ch. 4; Col. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. XXII, ch. 4. 
 90. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. I. 
 91. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. II, art. 348; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XII. 
 92. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. III, art. 399; Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. X, art. 2909. 
 93. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. V, art. 457; Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1102; 
Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § II, tit. I, ch. 2.  
 94. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI. 
 95. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. I, art. 1136; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX. 
 96. Span. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. VII, art. 546; Col. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. XI, art. 942 
(both in context of servitudes).  
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causa97 consideration ‘consideration 
(causa)’ on initial use; 
cause thereafter 
perturbación98 trespass [n.] disturbance [n.] 
mandato, mandata-
rio99 
agency, agent mandate, mandatary 
beneficio de es-
cusión100 
benefit of a levy benefit of discussion* 
herederos forzosos101 forced heirs* forced heirs* 
*terms presumably adopted from Louisiana Civil Code articles 
C. Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code Translation (1917): More Ci-
vilian Yet? 
 If anything, Joannini’s 1917 translation of the Argentine Civil 
Code was more “civilian” in feeling than his Colombian Civil Code 
translation. First, he continued to prefer distinctive Louisiana civil 
law terms such as acquets and gains,102 disinherison,103 solidary ob-
ligations,104 and benefit of discussion.105 The fact that standard edi-
tions of the Argentine Code include the drafter Dalmacio Vélez 
Sarsfield’s notes, with their occasional references to the 1825 Loui-
siana Civil Code, may have influenced Joannini in this respect.106 
                                                                                                             
 97. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. II. 
 98. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. VI, art. 1560; Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III. 
 99. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. IX; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XXVIII. 
 100. Span. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. XIV, arts. 1834-1837; Col. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. 
XXXV, arts. 2383-2384. 
 101. Span. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. III, art. 807; Col. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. V (for forced 
heirs). Also known (in the Philippines) as compulsory heirs.  
 102. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § III, tit. II, art. 1271 (gananciales = acquets and 
gains). (Joannini relied on the 1906 LaJouane edition for his translation, which 
had erroneously re-numbered articles to take into account new legislation and 
placed the code’s original article numbers in [brackets]. Only the earlier (correct) 
numeration is used here). 
 103. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. IV, § I, tit. XVI (desheredación = disinherison).  
 104. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § I, tit. XIV (obligaciones solidarias = solidary 
obligations).  
 105. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § III, tit. X, art. 2019 (beneficio de escusión = 
benefit of discussion).  
 106. See Tucker, supra note 54, at 295: the Civil Code of 1870 was itself a 
revision of the Civil Code of 1825, which was promulgated in French, translated 
into English. See also Tucker, supra note 54, at 290-92, it later had its own im-
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Second, Joannini clarified certain civil law terms that he had used 
inconsistently in his Canal Zone translation: he abandoned ‘fraud’ 
for dolo in favor of the Latin dolus, then placed fraude in parenthe-
ses to suggest a possible distinction between English fraud and the 
Argentine civil law concept (i.e., ‘fraud (fraude)’).107 Third, he 
purged various common law terms which had survived in his earlier 
project, including liens, consideration, betterments, breach (of con-
tract), and wear and tear.  
Even where Joannini preserved common law categorical distinc-
tions, he was careful to clarify civilian usage. In the matter of suc-
cessions, Joannini (rather unusually) distinguished between com-
mon law realty and personalty when he rendered cosas legadas as 
‘things bequeathed’ (when movable) and ‘things devised’ (when im-
movable).108 Nevertheless, Joannini provided a footnote explaining 
that in the Spanish-language original the one term legar encom-
passes both concepts, and that the distinction in legal English is not 
present in Spanish civil law.109 Elsewhere, he re-purposed devise 
and bequeath to instead distinguish between civil law concepts; in 
Book III, he used the former to refer to a transfer of naked or full 
ownership and the latter to refer to a transfer of rights merely of 
enjoyment of a thing or usufruct.110  
                                                                                                             
portant, indirect influence on Vélez Sarsfield’s Argentine Civil Code via Floren-
cio García Goyena’s Concordancias of 1852. See Agustín Parise, The Place of 
the Louisiana Civil Code in the Hispanic Civil Codifications: The Comments to 
the Spanish Civil Code Project of 1851, 68 LA. L. REV. 823, 848-52 (2008) [here-
inafter Parise, Hispanic Codifications]; see also Olivier Moréteau & Agustín 
Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 
1116 (2009).  
 107. See, e.g., Arg. Civ. C. Bk. II, § II, tit. I, ch. 2 (dolo = dolus); Bk. II, § II, 
tit. I, art. 954 (fraude = fraud).  
 108. See Arg. Civ. C. Bk. IV, § I, tit. XVII (cosas legadas = things bequeathed, 
things devised).  
 109. Arg. Civ. C. at 570 & n.20 (“This term [legado] includes both bequests 
and devises. Legatario, which has been translated legatee, includes both legatees 
and devisees. Devisee has, however, been used when a devise only and not also a 
bequest is involved. The verb legar has been translated by the words bequeath 
and devise, according to the class of property referred to.”).  
 110. See, e.g., Arg. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. X, arts. 2815-2816 (using ‘devise’ for 
legado in context of naked ownership, ‘bequeath’ for legado in context of usu-
fruct).  
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In addition to purifying the civilian vocabulary in this second 
translation, Joannini also supplemented the text with numerous foot-
notes that offered a comparative perspective on civilian terminol-
ogy. Thus, on the first use of servitude, Joannini explained that 
“[t]his term is used in lieu of the common law term easement not 
only because the latter is not the exact equivalent of servitude, but 
in order to be consistent in the use of civil law terms throughout this 
translation.”111 Similarly, on the first use of compensation, Joannini 
clarified that, “[c]ompensation resembles in many respects the com-
mon law set-off. The principal difference is that a set-off must be 
pled to be effectual; whereas compensation is effectual, without any 
such plea.”112 Even where Joannini concluded that the civil law and 
common law terms represented more or less identical concepts, he 
was careful to note the difference in terminology and persisted in 
using the civil law term instead of a more-accessible common law 
alternative. For example, in discussing transaction, Joannini con-
ceded that “[t]his term is the equivalent of the common-law com-
promise” yet reaffirmed his decision to use the civilian rather than 
legal English term, explaining that, “[a]s stated in the introductory 
note, civil law terms have been strictly adhered to in this transla-
tion.”113 Joannini then noted that ‘compromise’ means something 
“very different” in the civil law, and defined that term as well, rather 
than abandon the use of two civil law terms by substituting the more-
familiar ‘compromise’ and ‘settlement’.114 Similar footnotes clari-
fied civil law concepts such as cause,115 charges,116 cautions,117 and 
so on, usually with citations to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary or Howe’s 
Studies in the Civil Law.118  
                                                                                                             
 111. See id. at 7 & n.2.  
 112. See id. at 118 & n.11. 
 113. Id. at 118 & n.12. 
 114. Id. at 118 & n.12.  
 115. Id. at 87 & n.1. 
 116. Id. at 96 & n.7. 
 117. Id. at 250 & n.42.  
 118. See, e.g., id. at 87 & n.1, 97 & n.8.  
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In a “Translator’s Note,” Joannini was explicit about his objec-
tives as a translator, which had not changed significantly from his 
Colombian Civil Code translation a decade earlier: 
In the following translation . . . the translator has used civil 
law terms exclusively. Any attempt to employ common law 
terms would have led to confusion and obscurity, but the in-
dex has been so prepared to afford the common law lawyer 
enlightening facil’ty [sic] in consulting the work, and a num-
ber of footnotes have been inserted throughout giving au-
thorized definitions of words not defined in the text itself.119 
Joannini’s preference for banishing common law English terms 
such as bailments, chattels, and replevin to his index (itself over 100 
pages), and explaining differences in legal concepts in footnotes, 
may be considered a significant departure from Walton’s method.120 
For Walton, the comparative work of the translator occurs within the 
text; for Joannini, comparison appropriately belongs outside the text 
or in the postliminary materials. It is an approach that is often fol-
lowed today, but which was by no means universal at the time.  
D. Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code Translation (1920): A Modified 
Civilian Approach 
The Comparative Law Bureau’s final translation prior to its de-
mise was Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code of 1920. In large part, 
Wheless followed Joannini’s method, although not nearly to the 
same extent. The former’s approach is best described as an attempt 
to give the translation a civilian feel, while suggesting possible ave-
nues of comparison for the English-speaking lawyer with no 
knowledge of Portuguese or limited background in the civil law. 
Thus, Wheless, unlike Joannini, avoided many unusual civilian 
terms that would not be familiar to common law practitioners: he 
prefers ‘recover’ for reivindicar,121 ‘guardian’ for tutor,122 and 
                                                                                                             
 119. Id. at xix.  
 120. See, e.g., id. at 638, 642, 709 (index terms). 
 121. Braz. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. 2, art. 248 (reivindicar = recover). 
 122. Braz. Civ. C. Bk. I, tit. 7, ch. 1 (tutela = guardian). 
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‘merger’ for confusão.123 Distinctive Louisiana legal English terms, 
for the most part, have been omitted: there are no acquets and gains 
or disinherison,124 although obrigações solidarias has been ren-
dered solidary obligations.125 On the other hand, Wheless regularly 
employed civil law English terms for Brazilian property and con-
tract law concepts: he uses servitudes for servidões, movables and 
immovables for bens moveis and immoveis, redhibitory vices for vi-
cios redhibitorios, dation in payment for dação em pagamento.126 
Elsewhere, Wheless rendered Portuguese-language civil law con-
cepts into jurisdiction-neutral civilian English but placed an analo-
gous common law English term in parentheticals for clarification. 
Thus: ‘compensation (set-off)’ for compensação, ‘mandate (powers 
of attorney)’ for mandato, ‘deposit (bailment)’ for deposito.127 In 
many cases, Wheless simply left the original Portuguese-language 
civil law term in parentheses. The result is a translation that presents 
basic civilian concepts in civilian legal English where possible yet 
does not rely on jurisdiction-specific civil law terms from Louisi-
ana’s Civil Code. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 123. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 3, art. 804 (confusão = merger).  
 124. Cf. Braz. Civ. C. Bk. IV, tit. 3, ch. 15 (desherdação = disinheritance). 
 125. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 1, ch. 6 (obrigações solidarias = soli-
dary obligations). 
 126. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. II, tit. 3, art. 674 (servidões = servitudes), Bk. 
II (parte geral), tit. 1, ch.1 (bens immoveis, bens moveis = immovables, movables); 
Bk. III, tit. 4, ch. 5 (vicios redhibitorios = redhibitory vices); Bk. III, tit. 2, ch. 6 
(dação em pagamento = dation in payment). This last term is near to Louisiana’s 
‘giving in payment’ or ‘dation in paiement’. Cf. La. Civ. C. arts. 2655-2659 (1870) 
(giving in payment); see also Taylor v. Taylor, 24 So. 2d 74, 75 (La. 1945) 
(likening Louisiana law’s giving in payment to common-law ‘accord and satis-
faction’). 
 127. See, e.g., Braz. Civ. C. Bk. III, tit. 2, ch. 7 (compensação = compensation 
(set-off)); Bk. III, tit. 5, ch. 7 (mandato = mandate (powers of attorney)), Bk. III, 
tit. 5, ch. 6 (deposito = deposit (bailment)). 
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III. CRITICAL RESPONSES TO JOANNINI AND WHELESS: BOOK 
REVIEWS FROM LEGAL SCHOLARS  
Initially, civil law scholars took negligible interest in the War 
Department translations. There was little comment, for example, on 
Walton’s Spanish Civil Code translation or its methods, with one 
notable exception.128 Even less was said of Joannini’s Colombian 
Civil Code translation when it appeared a few years later, although 
the work was briefly mentioned by both the Harvard Law Review 
and Green Bag.129 Only Phanor Eder appears to have expressed an 
appreciation of the utility of a Spanish-English code translation that 
preferred civil law terms to legal English. In the preface to his 1910 
translation of Colombia’s mining laws, Eder stated cryptically that:  
[He was] somewhat indebted to the translations of the Civil 
Code [of Colombia] . . . by Frank L. Joannini . . . for the 
occasional rendering of a knotty word or phrase whose near 
equivalent (exactness is so often impossible so widely do the 
English and the Spanish systems of law differ) involved 
much groping . . . .130  
 When the Bureau turned to publishing its own civil code trans-
lations, however, interest from legal scholars was much greater. Re-
views in leading law journals alternated between effusive praise and 
strong criticism of Joannini’s and Wheless’s use of civilian termi-
nology. At first, the reviews were largely positive, particularly for 
Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code translation. For example, in an 
                                                                                                             
 128. The one exception was Joseph Henry Beale, Jr., whose otherwise positive 
review in the Harvard Law Review complained that Walton’s translation was “not 
always commendable; hispanicisms remain to obscure the sense, and per contra 
certain terms of our own law are misapplied to unlike Spanish ideas.” Joseph 
Henry Beale, Jr., The Civil Law in Spain and Spanish America, 14 HARV. L. REV. 
160 (1900) (book review). 
 129. The Civil Code of the Republic of Panama, 19 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1905) 
(book review); The Civil Code of the Republic of Panama and Amendatory Laws, 
17 GREEN BAG 556, 556 (1905) (book review) (stating that the translation is “said 
to be the first civil code of a Latin-American country to be translated into Eng-
lish.”). In fact, Joannini missed this distinction by at least a year. Cf. THE CIVIL 
CODE OF THE MEXICAN FEDERAL DISTRICT AND TERRITORIES (J.P. Taylor trans., 
American Book & Printing Co. 1904). 
 130. PHANOR JAMES EDER, THE MINING LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
COLOMBIA 3 (Press of B.S. Adams 1912). 
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April, 1917 review in the ABA Journal, New York attorney and pol-
itician F.D. Pavey praised Joannini for exhibiting the necessary sen-
sitivity to civil law-common law distinctions in vocabulary: 
One of the distinguishing features of the work is the manner 
in which the use of the civil law terms and common law 
terms has been co-ordinated. The translator, with excellent 
judgment, has used literal translations of civil law terms in 
the text of the translation. The corresponding ideas in Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence are usually expressed by terms of the 
common law which were either taken from other sources or 
were so altered in the course of their transit through the early 
stages of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that they bear no re-
semblance to the civil law terms.131 
 Likewise, in the same issue, former law librarian of Congress 
and Yale law professor Edwin Borchard stated that: 
No one who has had experience in rendering into English the 
legal concepts embraced in the system of a civil law country 
can fail to appreciate the difficulty of the translator’s task, 
nor be unduly captious in the criticism of terminology. The 
work under review incorporates civil law terms in literal 
translation, such as ‘prestation,’ ‘mandatory,’ [sic] ‘rehibi-
tory vices,’ [sic] ‘tutorship,’ ‘benefit of inventory,’ ‘fisc,’ 
‘usufruct,’ ‘paternal power,’ ‘revendication,’ ‘transaction,’ 
and numerous others. Sometimes the expression is explained 
in a footnote, at other times the Anglo-American lawyer will 
be compelled to bring to the subject some prior orientation. 
This method, however, whatever its weakness, is preferable 
to any attempt at a free translation, with its efforts, inevitably 
misleading and inaccurate, to employ a complete common-
law terminology.132 
In early 1918, however, negative reviews began to appear. Sev-
eral comparatists criticized Joannini’s civilian vocabulary, arguing 
that the translation method was a weakness, not a strength. Layton 
Register, who had studied law in Madrid and wrote several articles 
on French law from a comparative perspective, was the first to raise 
                                                                                                             
 131. Frank D. Pavey, The Argentine Civil Code, 3 A.B.A. J. 702, 704 (1917) 
(book review). 
 132. Edwin M. Borchard, The Argentine Civil Code, 3 A.B.A. J. 707, 707 
(1917) (book review). 
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an objection. Register wrote in the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review that Joannini’s avoidance of legal English’s technical terms 
was unnecessary, even counterproductive: 
He [the translator] decided to avoid a search for English 
equivalents and to take over bodily the terminology of mod-
ern Roman law. Against this method of itself we make no 
criticism beyond the inartistic invention of taking over of 
such words as ‘mandate,’ ‘benefit of inventory,’ ‘prestation,’ 
‘discussion,’ ‘dative,’ ‘dolous,’ ‘resolutory conditions,’ ‘sol-
idary obligations,’ ‘onerous contract of life annuity,’ (there 
is almost humor in this), ‘disinherison,’ ‘caution juratory,’ 
and many other terms that might be enumerated . . . . More-
over we do not at all admit that it is necessary to invent a 
terminology for words of Roman origin used to describe le-
gal institutions having a broad equivalent in the common law 
system. Any work on general jurisprudence would have en-
lightened the translator on the universalities of such catego-
ries as ‘agency,’ ‘bailment,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘lien,’ ‘defect.’ There 
[sic] need not be rendered by ‘mandate,’ ‘commodatum,’ 
‘offense,’ ‘privilege,’ ‘vice’ . . . .133 
 Two months later, Joseph Drake, who taught both Roman and 
Spanish civil law at Michigan, came to the translation’s defense. In 
what was a generally positive assessment in the Michigan Law Re-
view, Drake stated that “[t]he translator, who has already proved his 
capacity in several translations for the Bureau of Insular Affairs, has 
wisely transliterated civil law terms instead of attempting to find 
common translations for them . . . .”134 The reviewer also praised 
Joannini for placing every-day common law terms in a copious in-
dex “for those unacquainted with civil law phraseology.”135  
A final review, however, was the most negative by far: the au-
thor criticized Joannini’s use of exceptions and civil fruits instead of 
allegedly “equivalent terms” from the common law such as defenses 
                                                                                                             
 133. Register, supra note 8, at 182. 
 134. Joseph H. Drake, The Argentine Civil Code, 16 MICH. L. REV. 460, 469 
(1918) (book review). 
 135. Id. 
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and income and questioned the choice of compensation for compen-
sación (rather than set-off) and transaction for transacción.136 Of 
the last two examples, the reviewer stated that there was “no excuse” 
for “literal translations which result in evident confusion with Eng-
lish words, colloquial or technical, of different meaning.”137  
Reviews of Wheless’s Brazilian Civil Code translation a few 
years later were even more negative. Ernest Lorenzen, whose re-
search and teaching straddled both comparative law and conflicts of 
law, panned Wheless not for the quality of his translation, which he 
acknowledged “to be fairly accurate,” but rather for his adherence 
to civilian terminology.138 In echoes of Register from a few years 
before, Lorenzen wrote in the Yale Law Journal that: 
A good translation requires furthermore that the original text 
should be reduced into idiomatic English. In the case of a 
legal work this means that so far as possible the translation 
should be expressed in the legal terminology familiar to Eng-
lish and American lawyers. In this respect the translation is 
subject to criticism. In large number of instances where it 
would have been perfectly easy to give the English [i.e., 
common law] equivalent the Portuguese words have been 
simply anglicized.139 
In particular, Lorenzen criticized Wheless’s use of tradition in-
stead of ‘delivery’ (for tradição), dation in payment instead of ‘giv-
ing in payment’ (for dação em pagamento), transaction instead of 
‘compromise’ (for transação), and compromise instead of ‘arbitra-
tion’ (for compromisso), etc.140  
The most revealing of all the reviews, however, must be Max 
Radin’s critique of Wheless’s translation in the California Law Re-
view. According to Radin,  
                                                                                                             
 136. F.S. Philbrick, The Argentine Civil Code Together with the Constitution 
and Law of Civil Registry, 13 ILL. L. REV. 64, 67-69 (1918) (book review). 
 137. Id. at 69.  
 138. Lorenzen, supra note 8, at 652.  
 139. Id. at 652-53.  
 140. Id. at 653.  
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In all translation it is difficult to keep one’s linguistic bal-
ance, and the most careful writer finds himself lured into lit-
eral renderings that are quite unidiomatic in English. In law 
the difficulty is increased by the fact that we have to translate 
a fixed and technical terminology of one system of law into 
the fixed and technical terminology of a wholly different 
one. Most of the terms, even when superficially alike, have 
wholly different implications.141  
 In other words, Radin recognized the difference between the two 
legal systems in question but cautioned against transliterations that 
led to confusion with legal English. From Radin’s point of view, the 
job of the translator was principally to overcome the inconveniences 
of difference by rendering civil law concepts into the common law’s 
“fixed and technical terminology.” If there were too much risk of 
confusion, Radin argued for leaving such terms in the original lan-
guage, which he criticized Wheless for doing too sparingly.142  
IV. COMPETING COMPARATIST PARADIGMS OF CIVIL LAW-
COMMON LAW DIFFERENCE 
Criticism of Joannini’s approach to legal translation might sug-
gest, at first, a lack of sophistication about civilian terminology on 
the part of the more-negative reviewers, or at least minimal aware-
ness that use of legal English for distinct civil law concepts could 
obscure the nuances of civil law-common law difference. Yet such 
conclusions must be rejected, for Register, Lorenzen, and Radin 
were all scholars of civilian systems, and their writings reveal that 
they were well-acquainted with some of the critical differences be-
tween the two traditions.143 Instead, their indifference to preserving 
                                                                                                             
 141. Radin, supra note 8, at 444. 
 142. Id. at 443.  
 143. Register studied modern civil law in Paris and Madrid before the First 
World War and wrote mostly about comparative and international law topics. See, 
e.g., Layton B. Register, A Morning at the Paris Law School, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 
33 (1912); Layton B. Register, The Dual System of Civil and Commercial Law, 
61 U. PA. L. REV. 240 (1913). He also contributed to several legal translation pro-
jects himself. See, e.g., SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECT ESSAYS BY VARIOUS 
AUTHORS (Ernest Brunker & Layton B. Register trans., Boston Book Co. 1917). 
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a separate civilian vocabulary in English (in the case of Register and 
Lorenzen) was an informed one and more likely reflects assump-
tions about the nature of civil law-common law difference that were 
widely-held among early 20th century American legal scholars. 
Such assumptions in turn affected attitudes to perceived differences 
in legal terminology as well as legal translation. 
Of these assumptions, the most important was the widespread 
belief (reaching then perhaps the height of its influence) that the civil 
and common law traditions were more alike than previously thought 
and that remaining differences were historically contingent or de-
clining in importance.144 The popular form of this theory likely had 
its origins with Henry Sumner Maine’s “Roman Law and Legal Ed-
ucation,” first published in the 1856 Cambridge Essays and included 
in later editions of Village-communities in the East and West (1871), 
in which the English legal historian argued that the world’s two great 
legal systems, English law and Roman law, were becoming more 
alike as English law followed a similar trajectory of historical de-
velopment.145 Moreover, the British Empire’s rapid commercial and 
                                                                                                             
Lorenzen is better known for his work on conflicts of law, but he also wrote sev-
eral articles on Roman, civil, and comparative law and was an occasional contrib-
utor to both American and French comparative law journals. See, e.g., Ernest Gus-
tav Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 
621 (1919) (comparing civil law and common law doctrines); Ernest Gustav Lo-
renzen, The German 1908 Law of Checks, 2 ANN. BULL. 29 (1909); see also Ar-
thur L. Corbin, Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, 60 YALE L.J. 579, 580 (1951) (describing 
Lorenzen’s academic background and interest in Roman and European compara-
tive law). Lorenzen’s preoccupation with private international law, however, un-
doubtedly colored his attitudes to the potential purposes of legal comparison. By 
contrast, Radin was destined for a career as a Roman and civil law scholar. See, 
e.g., MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (West Publ’g Co. 1927); Max Ra-
din, Fundamental Concepts of Roman Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 207 (1925).  
 144. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 13 (lecture I) (arguing that Roman and Eng-
lish law were more similar than typically imagined and proposing numerous ex-
amples). Howe believed that historical development, rather than cultural condi-
tions, explained most differences between national legal systems, and he thought 
classical and modern civil law very similar. About Roman and American admi-
ralty practice, Howe claimed (without any sense of hyperbole) that “[i]f the gra-
cious shade of Ulpian could appear in a district court of the United States in an 
admiralty case, he would require but a brief preparation either in principle or prac-
tice.” HOWE, supra note 56, at 48.  
 145. See Henry Sumner Maine, Roman Law and Legal Education, in 
CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 1, 2 (1856):   
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colonial expansion brought English lawyers into renewed contact 
with civilian systems and encouraged English lawyers to think of 
English and Roman law as the twin foundations of world law. By 
1901, James Bryce was predicting that, though neither system was 
likely “to overpower or absorb the other” in geopolitical terms, it 
was nevertheless possible that “they may draw nearer, and that out 
of them there may be developed, in the course of ages, a system of 
rules of private law which shall be practically identical as regards 
contracts and property and civil wrongs . . . .”146 A generation later, 
Radin himself stated that, “[t]he most obvious movement in law at 
the present time is the gradual assimilation which is taking place 
between the modified Roman law of most modern countries and the 
only system that can pretend to rival it, the common law of England, 
the United States, Canada and Australia.”147 
The idea that English law and Roman law were growing more 
alike was initially rooted in abstract (and often erroneous) theories 
of the common law’s historical development, but political events 
during the period tended to lend credibility to such explanations. 
Among these was the steady development of mixed legal systems, 
                                                                                                             
It is not because our own jurisprudence and that of Rome were once alike 
that they ought to be studied together – it is because they will be alike. It 
is because all laws, however dissimilar in their infancy, tend to resemble 
each other in their maturity; and because we in England are slowly, and 
perhaps unconsciously or unwillingly, but still steadily and certainly ac-
customing ourselves to the same modes of legal thought and to the same 
conceptions of legal principle to which the Roman jurisconsults had at-
tained after centuries of accumulated experience and unwearied cultiva-
tion (emphasis in original).  
See also HENRY SUMNER MAINE, VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND 
WEST 332-33 (3d ed., H. Holt 1880). But see Michele Graziadei, Changing 
Images of the Law in XIX Century English Legal Thought, in THE RECEPTION 
OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 1820-1920 (Mathias 
Reimann ed., Duncker & Humblot 1993) (examining 19th century trends in 
English legal history and their effects on perceptions of similarity/difference 
with continental legal systems and stating that assumptions of a close (histor-
ical) relationship between Roman and English law were already in decline by 
last quarter of 19th century). 
 146. JAMES BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 122-23 (Oxford 
U. Press 1901).  
 147. RADIN, supra note 143, at 101.  
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both in the British Empire as a result of 18th and 19th century im-
perial growth (for example, in Lower Canada and the Cape Colony), 
as well as in the United States’ new insular territories (such as Puerto 
Rico, the Philippines, and, briefly, Panama). The creation of these 
systems, which generally combined English (or American) public 
law and some form of modern civil law, suggested the interchange-
ability or compatibility of civil and common law systems, or at least 
the declining significance of civil law-common law distinctions. At 
the very most, bijural mixing promised new opportunities for judges 
to select the best rules from each tradition to create a third, superior, 
system, a project not unrelated to the original goals of European 
comparative law.148 In this spirit, R.W. Lee, a Roman-Dutch scholar 
with practical and academic experience in the legal systems of Que-
bec and Ceylon, pronounced in 1915 that “we are at the end of the 
time in which it is still possible to contemplate the Civil Law and 
the Common Law as separate and self-contained entities . . . . They 
are becoming assimilated.”149 The French comparatist Henri Lévy-
Ullmann came to a similar conclusion in an article reviewing the 
development of another mixed jurisdiction, Scotland. Lévy-
Ullmann happily predicted that the future “law of the civilised na-
tions” would be, like Scots law, a “combination between the Anglo-
Saxon system and the continental system.”150  
                                                                                                             
 148. Cf. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Cultural Voices of Judges and Jurist: 
Purists, Pragmatists, and Pollutionists, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE, 
supra note 11, at 41 (associating this view of the mixed jurisdictions as “labora-
tories of comparative law” with “pragmatists”).  
 149. R.W. Lee, Civil Law and Common Law: A World Survey, 14 MICH. L. 
REV. 89, 100 (1915) (“The law of the future, like the first man fashioned by Pro-
metheus, will consist of particles gathered from every side, will be as composite 
as an English plum pudding.”). Others were more skeptical about Roman-Dutch 
law’s capacity for survival against the onslaught of English common law’s global 
expansion. See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 31 
(Cambridge U. Press 1901) (Rede lecture) (stating that “the so-called ‘Roman 
Dutch’ law of certain outlying parts of the British Empire now stands alone, and 
few, I imagine, would foretell for it a brilliant future . . . .”).  
 150. Henri Lévy-Ullmann, Law of Scotland, 37 JURID. REV. 370, 390 (1925). 
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American comparatists soon put such theories to use in their own 
Pan-American context. In the Virginia Law Review’s very first arti-
cle, Hannis Taylor, following Bryce, argued that it was “hard to 
overestimate the importance of the fusion now going on between 
Roman private and English public law in the state systems of Latin 
America,” a reference to the mix of private law and republican forms 
of government in the independent republics of South America.151 
Extrapolating from Latin American examples to a more global per-
spective, Taylor asked his readers rhetorically, “[W]ho is willing to 
deny that out of this fusion of Roman private and English public law 
there is arising throughout the world a new and composite state sys-
tem, whose outer shell is English constitutional law, including jury 
trials in criminal cases, and whose interior code is Roman private 
law?”152 For those in doubt, Taylor argued that Louisiana showed 
what could be accomplished. As early as 1899, he told the state’s 
bar that their mixed jurisprudence was an “epitome of all that is best 
in the past, and as an index finger that points to the ultimate form 
which the state system of the Western Hemisphere may possibly as-
sume.”153  
For Bureau founder William Smithers, the two opportunities for 
legal mixing presented by the new insular possessions and the Pan-
American movement were directly-related. In 1909, Smithers glee-
fully announced that the mixing of Spanish civil and Anglo-Ameri-
can common law in the United States was leading to the “inaugura-
tion of a distinct system to be known as American law” which would 
“draw perfection from every juridical, philosophical, ethical and po-
litical source . . .” available, irrespective of national origin.154 Two 
years later, he touted the benefits of better knowledge of Hispanic 
                                                                                                             
 151. Hannis Taylor, The Jurisprudence of Latin America, 1 VA. L. REV. 1, 13 
(1913).  
 152. Id. 
 153. Hannis Taylor, A Comparative Study of Roman and English Law, in the 
Old World and the New, 7 AM. LAW. 473, 476 (1899).  
 154. William W. Smithers, Comparative Law as a Practical Science 5 (1909) 
(paper given at Pennsylvania Bar Association meeting). 
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legal systems so that the Hispanic world’s civil law systems might 
“be amalgamated with the Common Law and later American legis-
lation.”155 Perceptions that the uniform state law movement held out 
an important opportunity for commercial integration during a period 
of national economic expansion likewise reinforced assumptions 
that comparison’s primary utility was to mitigate the myriad (usu-
ally commercial) inconveniences of legal diversity. It is significant 
that several comparatists considered here, including Smithers and 
Walton, were supporters of the uniform state law movement and that 
Lobingier twice proposed extending the movement’s successes to 
the Philippines.156 In addition, Register’s writings appear to suggest 
that his own interest in comparison centered on the promise of har-
monizing systems, while Lorenzen’s interests in private interna-
tional law reflect a similar hermeneutic.157  
From far parts of the globe, American colonial judges also 
joined voices such as Taylor’s and Smithers’ by insisting that legal 
blending was not only feasible but that legal difference could be 
overcome with facility. In particular, several American territorial 
judges in the Philippines argued that they were witnessing legal con-
vergence between the civil law and the common law in their own 
courtrooms and boasted that the process was proceeding without in-
cident. For example, Charles Lobingier, a trial judge sitting on the 
Court of First Instance in Manila, wrote in 1911 that the task of 
                                                                                                             
 155. William W. Smithers, Latin America, 3 ANN. BULL. 14, 15 (1911) (ex-
plicitly linking comparison and Pan-Americanism).  
 156. See William W. Smithers, Editorial Miscellany, 3 ANN. BULL. 10 (1910) 
(“The educative force of the many years devoted to uniform legislation has not 
only secured national recognition for that work, but aroused a sense of apprecia-
tion, both lay and professional, to the advantages of comparative law study gen-
erally.”); Charles S. Lobingier, Civil Law Rights through Common Law Remedies, 
20 JURID. REV. 97 (1908) (recommending the extension of uniform state law 
movement to Philippines); Charles S. Lobingier, Codification in the Philippines, 
3 ANN. BULL. 42 (1910) (similar) [hereinafter Lobingier, Codification].  
 157. In general, Register never liked a civil law system better than when it was 
in the process of adopting common-law methods. See, e.g., Layton B. Register, 
Judicial Powers of Interpretation under Foreign Codes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 39, 
50 (1916) (expressing cautious optimism that Swiss Civil Code of 1912’s prelim-
inary title had opened door to greater use of case law as supplementary legal au-
thority). 
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American courts in that colony had been to “adjust, harmonize and 
blend the two distinct systems.”158 Clearly satisfied with the pro-
gress made over the previous decade, Lobingier told fellow Bureau 
members that “the experiment has demonstrated the feasibility of 
blending segments of the Civil and the Common (Anglo-American) 
law, the two systems which divide the civilized world, thus confirm-
ing the view that at root the two are really one.”159  
Assumptions that civil law-common law difference was illusory 
or declining in importance soon had a predictable impact on atti-
tudes to civilian terminology. English-speaking civil law scholars, 
in their efforts to explain allegedly superficial distinctions between 
the two systems, frequently promoted the idea that such distinctions 
were principally limited to differences in procedure and vocabulary, 
rather than substance. For example, in his widely-read Studies in the 
Civil Law, Howe had argued that the “difference between the civil 
law and the common law is by no means so great as some persons 
imagine . . . . There are differences of terminology, which, to some, 
seem strange and alien, but when they are once understood, the lead-
ing doctrines are found to be much the same.”160 In fact, Howe told 
his readers, the common law’s “technical terms” largely covered the 
same “topics” of the civil law.161 In the opinion of Sir Frederick Pol-
lock, “[t]he more we look into other civilized [i.e., non-English] 
modern laws, the more we shall find that under all differences of 
terminology and procedure the results come out not much un-
like.”162  
                                                                                                             
 158. Lobingier, Juridical Fusion, supra note 13, at 38-39. See also the com-
ments of American colonial judge George Malcolm a few years later, which are 
very similar. Philippine Law, 11 ILL. L. REV. 331, 332 (1917) (“The two great 
streams of the law, the civil, the legacy of Rome to Spain coming from the west, 
and the common, the inheritance of the United States from Great Britain coming 
from the east, have here in the Philippines, met and blended.”).  
 159. Lobingier, Codification, supra note 156, at 41-42 (citing BRYCE, supra 
note 146, at 122-23).  
 160. HOWE, supra note 13, at 149 (emphasis supplied). 
 161. Id. at 8. 
 162. Frederick Pollock, Genius of the Common Law, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 660, 
661 (1912). 
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It is interesting to note that Pollock’s comment was followed 
with the claim that, “[n]o sane and impartial man will believe that in 
the main there is not as good justice in Edinburgh as in London, or 
at Montreal as at Toronto,” a clear reference to two mixed systems 
(Scotland and Quebec).163 Indeed, it was evidence from the mixed 
systems that convinced many that vocabularies were the last to 
merge in the process of legal convergence. Thus, Lee, predicting 
that the civil law and common law were blending on a global scale, 
claimed that the two traditions’ “assimilation will, before very long, 
be complete, the difference, if any remains, being a difference rather 
of terminology than of substance,” a conclusion similar to Pol-
lock’s.164 Likewise, in an article reviewing the common law’s rapid 
global spread, Roscoe Pound (yet another early Bureau member) de-
scribed the outlier Louisiana as a “common-law system in all but its 
terminology” and stated elsewhere that “[e]xcept as it lingers in their 
legal vocabulary, the Scotch have almost abandoned Roman law in 
all their courts.”165 In The Spirit of the Common Law, Pound cast 
significant doubt on the civil law’s very survival in the mixed sys-
tems, apart from their unique legal lexicons, when he stated that 
“[i]n the Philippines and in Porto Rico there are many signs that 
common-law administration of a Roman code will result in a system 
Anglo-American in substance if Roman-Spanish in its terms.”166 
Comments such as these suggest a prevalent suspicion that civilian 
vocabularies were holdovers of a past era of legal diversity. Moreo-
ver, the emphasis on terminology as the principal locus of difference 
or the fading indicia of a divided past was clearly a consistent theme 
for many English-speaking scholars of the period and one that re-
flected their specific historical and political circumstances.  
                                                                                                             
 163. Id. at 661-62.  
 164. Lee, supra note 149, at 100. 
 165. Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 GREEN BAG 17, 17-18 
(1906) (citations omitted).  
 166. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 2 (Marshall Jones Co. 
1921). 
2018] SPANISH-ENGLISH CIVIL CODE TRANSLATIONS 145 
 
 
 
By contrast, it was among those comparatists who emphasized 
civil law-common law difference in their scholarship (law profes-
sors such as Borchard and Sherman) or who expressed skepticism 
about the speed of the hypothesized global legal convergence (such 
as the colonial judge Peter Hamilton) that criticism of Walton’s 
translation, and praise of Joannini’s and Wheless’s, was most relia-
bly encountered.167 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Scholars of comparative law have frequently noted the important 
role that intellectual history and global politics have played in the 
discipline’s development, both in terms of its scholarly ambitions 
and its fundamental assumptions.168 The history of English-speak-
ing comparison in particular is replete with examples (some dating 
to the early modern period) of the impact of contemporary trends in 
politics and ideology on English and American attitudes to the civil 
law tradition.169 Indeed, shifting priorities in domestic politics and 
                                                                                                             
 167. See, e.g., Peter J. Hamilton, The Civil Law and the Common Law, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 180, 190 & n.25 (1922) (expressing more-skeptical stance to rapid 
civil law-common law convergence, criticizing Walton’s translation of causa as 
consideration); Charles P. Sherman, Salient Features of the Argentine Law of 
Sale, 14 ILL. L. REV. 617, 618 & n.9 (1920) (praising Joannini’s translation as a 
“splendid work”); Charles P. Sherman, Salient Features of the Brazilian Law of 
Sale, 42 CAN. L. TIMES 648, 650 & n. 4 (1922) (praising Wheless’s translation as 
a “most excellent and scholarly work”); see also Edwin M. Borchard, Some Les-
sons from the Civil Law, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 570, 581 (1916) (emphasizing sub-
stantive differences between civil law and common law systems, in particular use 
of stare decisis).  
 168. See, e.g., Gerhard Danneman, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or 
Differences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 386-89 (Ma-
thias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford U. Press 2006) (discussing 
20th-century comparative law’s emphasis on legal convergence); see also Maria 
Pargendler, The Rise and Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043, 
1062-73 (2012) (describing 19th-century globalization’s effects on comparative 
thought and stating that “[i]n the rapidly globalizing world of the nineteenth-cen-
tury, early comparatists seemed less concerned with measuring differences across 
legal systems than with paving the way for legal convergence. The purpose of 
most comparative works was to search for common ground amidst apparent di-
versity.”). 
 169. See BRIAN P. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND, 1603-1641: A 
POLITICAL STUDY (Clarendon Press 1973), ch. 3-5 (examining the relationship 
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intellectual history have often shaped common law views of the civil 
law tradition in either positive (when viewed as a scientific or uni-
versal system) or negative directions (when viewed as fundamen-
tally foreign).170 As the degree of difference between the two sys-
tems has taken on important implications for European legal inte-
gration, what had once been a particular preoccupation of English-
speaking legal scholars has become an important concern and point 
of debate among European comparatists as well.171  
The turn of the last century was one such moment in the cyclical 
history of changing common law attitudes to the civil law tradition, 
particularly in American comparative thought. Both Pan-American-
ism’s emphasis on uniform commercial legislation and legal mixing 
in the new insular possessions created heightened expectations of 
legal convergence across the civil law-common law frontier, though 
                                                                                                             
between political ideology and Puritan/Royalist attitudes to English civil law tra-
dition during period leading up to Civil War); Luigi Moccia, English Attitudes to 
the Civil Law, 2 J. LEG. HIST. 157, 159-60, 164 (1981) (arguing that “traditional, 
‘antagonistic’ attitude of common lawyers towards ‘civil law’ . . . finds an expla-
nation in [17th century] English constitutional history . . . .”); see also Peter Stein, 
The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV. 
403, 407-14 (1966) (discussing early 19th century American lawyers’ interest in 
civil law tradition and attributing use of civil law to variety of practical and intel-
lectual factors).  
 170. Compare Daniel R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation I: The 
English Civilian Writers, 1523-1607, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1981) (noting 
traditional Whig/common-law associations of the civil law tradition in general 
with royal absolutism), and HOWE, supra note 56, at 37 (“[W]e may all admit that 
down to times long after those of Blackstone the civil law was associated in the 
minds of many Englishmen with a system that was thought to be most hostile and 
alien to the liberties of England.”), with R.H. Helmholz, Continental Law and 
Common Law: Historical Strangers or Companions?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1207, 
1224-26 (1990) (discussing early American perceptions of civil law as closer to 
natural law and universal legal principles and concluding that during period 
“[n]either English nor American lawyers seemed to regard the division between 
common law and civil law as an absolute and unbridgeable gulf.”), and M.H. 
Hoeflich, Comparative Law in Antebellum America, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. 
L. REV. 535, 536 (2005) (stating that, “by the second decade of the nineteenth 
century, the English common law was widely seen as the legal system of a tyran-
nous enemy regime,” identifying this attitude as one of several “reasons for Amer-
ican jurists to look at other legal systems . . . .” for answers to legal problems). 
 171. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 
45 INT’L L. & COMP. L.Q. 52, 64 (1996) (arguing that, despite European compar-
atists’ de-emphasis of civil law-common law difference in support of EU’s project 
of legal integration, the two traditions are “irreducibly different”).  
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in different contexts. Political developments in both spheres of ac-
tivity prompted ideologically-motivated justifications for such con-
vergence, including the proposition that future mixed systems would 
be stronger or combine the best of both traditions.172 Indeed, over-
coming civil law-common law difference was inherent to both pro-
cesses, and the expansion of English common law at the civil law’s 
expense in the bijural systems had additional implications for per-
ceptions of difference in legal terminology. 
That perceptions of civil law-common law difference might 
have affected contemporary attitudes to legal translation of civilian 
concepts into English should hardly be surprising given the close 
relationship between legal English and the common law tradition.173 
The stakes are particularly high in mixed jurisdictions where Eng-
lish-speaking judges and lawyers may unknowingly import common 
law doctrines into civilian jurisprudence via the use of legal Eng-
lish,174 and the possibility of injury to the civilian interpretative 
framework is also suggested when we recall that “the language of a 
civil code in particular, is also a technical and scientific lan-
guage.”175 In response, several scholars of Louisiana’s civil law tra-
dition caution strongly against such translation approaches and ar-
gue convincingly that it is possible to express the civil law in English 
without adopting the terms and concepts of the common law.176 
                                                                                                             
 172. See, e.g., José Trías Monge, Legal Methodology in Some Mixed Jurisdic-
tions, 78 TUL. L. REV. 333, 349-50 (2003) (arguing that American colonial judges 
embraced “Fantasy of the Wise Mix” and “Fantasy of the Unification of Law” as 
ideological justifications for introduction of common law concepts into early 20th 
century Puerto Rican and Filipino jurisprudence).  
 173. See GUTTERIDGE, supra note 1, at 117-18; Rotman, supra note 1, at 189; 
Moréteau, supra note 1, at 706-09; Levasseur & Feliú supra note 1, at 735.  
 174. See, e.g., T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition, in CIVIL 
LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 16 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed. 1965) (“[L]et 
me stress that mixed legal systems which use English as the language of the courts 
are particularly exposed to subversion through imposition or incautious ac-
ceptance of technical terms of Anglo-American common lawyers as equivalents 
to civilian concepts. A torrent of alien jurisprudence can pour through the 
breaches thus made.”).  
 175. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE: SOURCES OF LAW 
AND METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 61 (2015). 
 176. See, e.g., Levasseur & Feliú, supra note 1, at 717 (arguing that: 
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Alain Levasseur and Vicenç Feliú in particular have stated that the 
Louisiana Civil Code’s 200-year history is proof that a “uniform” 
and “consistent” translation into English of civil law concepts of 
similar lexical origin is feasible, regardless of whether the source 
language is Spanish or French.177 Elsewhere, Levasseur and Randall 
Trahan argue for the special importance of “securing the survival of 
the civil law tradition in general by anchoring it in the English lan-
guage and not just any English language, but an English language 
different from the English language of the common law.”178  
Against this backdrop, Joannni’s use of Louisiana’s special ci-
vilian vocabulary at the turn of the last century appears remarkably 
prescient. It is perhaps also ironic that his resort to Louisiana’s spe-
cial legal lexicon came at a period in time when that state’s future 
identity as a civilian jurisdiction was itself in doubt, a historical mo-
ment reflected in Pound’s assumption of the common law’s total tri-
umph there.179 Moreover, the attention to the subtle nuances of civil 
law-common law difference embraced by Levasseur, Feliú, and Tra-
han may reflect a high degree of concern for keeping the two tradi-
                                                                                                             
[T]here is no need to resort to the legal vocabulary found in the Common 
Law of England to express the ‘civil law in English.’ Actually, we are 
issuing a strong warning against any such attempt. The survival of the 
civil law system in the English language of the Louisiana Civil Code 
since 1808 is a vivid testimony that the civil law can exist in ‘English’ 
as long as it is an English that has been tested and tried in a civil law 
environment.); 
see also Agustín Parise, A Translator’s Toolbox: The Law, Moreau-Lislet’s Li-
brary, and the Presence of Multilingual Dictionaries in Nineteenth-Century Lou-
isiana, 76 LA. L. REV. 1163, 1164-65 (2016) (stating that “[s]cholars both of Con-
tinental European and common law systems may look to Louisiana for civil law 
terminology in English” and arguing that “scholars should esteem the more than 
200-year-old tradition of English language civil law codification in Louisiana.”).  
 177. Levasseur & Feliú, supra note 1, at 735.  
 178. Alain A. Levasseur & J. Randall Trahan, Our Approach to Translation, 
in GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE xiv (Alain Levasseur & Ma-
rie-Eugénie Laporte-Legeais trans., Lexis Nexis 2014).  
 179. See, e.g., A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?, 54 
TUL. L. REV. 830, 833-34 (1980) (reviewing perceptions of Louisiana lawyers of 
the 1910s-1930s that the state was no longer a predominantly civilian jurisdic-
tion).  
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tions separate as independent sources of jurisprudence. At a mini-
mum, they suggest the worldview of the “purist” or “pragmatist” 
rather than the “pollutionist.”180 Yet in some eras, legal pollution 
has been regarded as a virtue, and the difference between pollution 
and pragmatism has become obscured or contested as particular ide-
ological requirements shifted.  
F.L. Joannini worked in such an era. Yet, despite comparatist 
crosscurrents to the contrary, he remained resolutely sensitive to the 
implications of legal diversity across numerous translations span-
ning more than a decade. If, as has been argued here, his contempo-
raries viewed civil law-common law difference as a matter of termi-
nology and procedure, rather than substance, then it is not surprising 
that some reviewers were relatively indifferent to the risks inherent 
in translating civilian concepts into legal English. Certainly, such 
critics were not likely to welcome the preservation of allegedly su-
perficial civil law-common law distinctions through the introduction 
or incorporation of unique civilian English terms. This would be es-
pecially true if they shared the assumption of some legal scholars 
that terms such as compensation, transaction, and dation survived 
only as civilian fig-leaves for nakedly universal legal categories. 
Such attitudes may also help explain the mix of positive and nega-
tive reviews for Joannini’s Argentine Civil Code translation and that 
of Wheless after him. Indeed, the fact that in a slightly-different con-
text Clifford Walton took a radically divergent approach and largely 
escaped criticism for it suggests how unpredictable opinions on civil 
law-common law difference were at the beginning of the last cen-
tury. 
“Translation illustrates the inseparability of law and language, 
and the field of translation is an extraordinarily rich source for in-
sights into the process of comparison,” states one comparatist 
                                                                                                             
 180. See Palmer, supra note 148, at 39-44 (offering a paradigm for mixed ju-
risdiction “purists” and “pollutionists”).  
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scholar.181 In the case of Joannini’s Spanish-English civil code 
translations, both the translator’s method and contemporary com-
paratist reviews are indeed “rich sources.” Each provides us with a 
glimpse of early 20th century comparatist perceptions of civil law-
common law difference at a critical moment in the history of Pan-
Americanism and in the evolution of this country’s current and for-
mer mixed legal systems. Joannini’s embrace of the special civilian 
language of the Louisiana Civil Code also demonstrates yet another 
way in which that state’s civil law tradition has served as a vehicle 
for U.S.-Latin American legal comparison.182 
 
                                                                                                             
 181. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Catego-
ries in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 54 (1998).  
 182. See, e.g., Parise, Hispanic Codifications, supra note 106 (describing in-
fluence of Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 on 19th-century Latin American codifi-
cations). 
